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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARKANSAS'S
PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL ROBOCALLS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine two opposing political candidates, each of whom hold very
different understandings of an unenforced state campaign statute. Candidate
A believes the statute is enforceable and decides not to use the prohibited
tactic despite the fact that the statute has never before been enforced. Candi-
date B, however, believes the statute is unconstitutional and, consequently,
uses the tactic. Assuming the tactic is one that would benefit any party that
uses it, which of these candidates made the better decision?
This scenario repeats itself around the nation each election year as can-
didates decide whether to employ robocalls' in their campaigns. As many as
twenty-eight states have enacted some form of regulation pertaining to polit-
ical robocalls, though many states do not enforce these regulations. 2 Accord-
ing to Arkansas statutory law, robocalls cannot be used "for soliciting in-
formation, gathering data, or for any other purpose in connection with a
political campaign." 3 But to the dismay of many Arkansans, political
robocalls are a common occurrence during election season. Although this
statute was recently enforced against a private company,4 there has not yet
been an attempt to enforce it against political candidates who use them in
their campaigns.5
1. For a definition of robocalls, see infra Part II.A.
2. Jason C. Miller, Note, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the Sound of or
a Threat to, Democracy?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 213, 229-30 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.mttlr.org/volsixteen/miller.pdf. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Flori-
da, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Wyoming all have some form of state regulation. See id. at 229-30 nn.127-28; State Laws,
WINNING CALLS.COM, http://winningcalls.com/statelaws.html (last visited May 3, 2012).
3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-204(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
4. In April 2010, Arkansas's Attorney General, Dustin McDaniel, settled a lawsuit with
a Florida-based company that allegedly violated, among other things, Arkansas's prohibition
on commercial robocalls. Attorney General Announces Robocall Settlement,
ARKANSASONLINE (Apr. 15, 2010, 1:57 PM),
http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/20 10/apr/ 5/attorney-general-announces-robocall-
settlement/.
5. While private parties may have attempted to enforce this statute against a particular
candidate, the state of Arkansas has made no official attempt to charge political candidates
with a violation of the statute.
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This note argues that Arkansas's statutory prohibition on political
robocalls ought to remain in effect, but that it is unconstitutional as currently
written, in part because it regulates speech in a content-based manner, and,
thus, should be reworded. In Part II, this note examines the pros and cons of
robocalls, concluding that certain restrictions on political robocalls are de-
sirable. Then, Part III examines the current state of relevant constitutional
case law in the nation. Next, Part IV shows how Arkansas's regulation on
political robocalls, as currently written, fails to survive a First Amendment
challenge. Finally, Part V proposes that Arkansas reword its robocall statute
in a manner that would most likely allow it to pass constitutional review.
II. REGULATION OF ROBOCALLS IS DESIRABLE
There are both positive and negative aspects to the use of political
robocalls. While robocall users typically reap the majority of the benefits,
the weight of the burdens usually falls on robocall recipients, opposing po-
litical campaigns, and unrelated third parties.
A. Definition and Explanation of "Political Robocalls"
The term "robocall"6 is a generic term used to describe a broad spec-
trum of automated phone calls.7 The common characteristic of all robocalls
is that the caller plays a prerecorded message for all, or a significant portion,
of the phone call. In this way, robocalls differ in both form and function
from ordinary phone calls. Ordinarily, telephone conversations include bi-
lateral communication between the caller and the person called. But with
6. "Robocall," "robo-call," and "automated call" are interchangeable and essentially
refer to the same type of calls. The author chose "robocall" because it is the term and spelling
most common. See generally Miller, supra note 2, at 214 n.8; Josephine Hearn, A Hangup
About Robocalls, PoLITICO (Feb. 28, 2008, 5:12 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0208/8742.html.
7. The definition of "robocall" varies depending on who defines it. Some definitions of
"robocall" require that the call both be dialed randomly by a computerized dialer and play a
pre-recorded message. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-204(a)(1); Robocall Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/robocall?s--t (last visited May 3,
2012). Others simply define it as an automated phone call that delivers a prerecorded mes-
sage. Robocall Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/robocall (last visited May 3, 2012). However, because recipients of
robocalls typically have no way of knowing whether the phone call originated through an
automated, computerized, or randomized dialer, the most common recognizable characteristic
of a robocall to the call's recipient is the prerecorded message.
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robocalls, the communication is unilateral and more akin to broadcasting or
a mass-mailed advertising than it is to a telephone conversation.8
Arkansas's statutory prohibition on robocalls specifically defines them
as the use of a telephone that "involves an automated system for the selec-
tion and dialing of telephone numbers and the playing of recorded messages
when a message is completed to the called number." 9 In other words, a
robocall is a phone call that is made by a computer that automatically selects
and dials phone numbers and then plays prerecorded messages to the person
who answers the call or to the answering machine.
B. The Positive Aspects of Political Robocalls
While the actual effectiveness of political robocalls for some purposes
is debatable,'0 they provide many desirable features and benefits to political
campaigns. For example, modem technology makes it possible to place
massive quantities of automated phone calls in very short periods of time. "
While Politico reports that one robocall firm claims it can place a million
robocalls in less than thirty minutes, 2  other firms, such as
VoiceBroadcasting, "can send thousands of calls per minute" due, in part, to
predictive dialing.'3 Astonishingly, one firm claims that on some days it
8. Perhaps this difference in the function of a robocall compared to normal telephone
conversations explains why robocalls are sometimes referred to as "voice broadcasting." See,
e.g., Automated Dialing, VOICEBROADCASTING,
http://www.voicebroadcasting.org/services/automated-dialing/ (last visited May 3, 2012).
9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-204(a)(1). Robocalls in Arkansas are only unlawful when
made
for the purpose of offering any goods or services for sale, or for conveying in-
formation regarding any goods or services for the purpose of soliciting the sale or
purchase of the goods or services, or for soliciting information, gathering data, or
for any other purpose in connection with a political campaign.
Id. Robocalls made in regards to the status of a purchase previously made, or made in re-
sponse to a call initiated by the person to whom the robocall is directed, are not prohibited by
this statute. Id. § 5-63-204(a)(2).
10. At least one study has shown that robocalls "did not produce statistically significant
effects on [voter] turnout." Ricardo Ramirez, Giving Voice to Latino Voters: A Field Experi-
ment on the Effectiveness of a National Nonpartisan Mobilization Effort, ANNALS AM. AcAD.
POL. & SOC. Sc., Sept. 2005, at 66, 79 (study showed only eighty-six additional votes were
generated from 240,951 robocalls at a total cost of $23,725, or $275 per vote). One explana-
tion for why robocalls mna, nit be that effective is people may "ignore them, disbelieve their
content, or forget what they have heard." Peter Levine & Mark Hugo Lopez, What We Should
Know About the Effectiveness of Campaigns but Don't, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.,
Sept. 2005, at 180, 187.
11. Hearn, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. See Political Automated Calls, VOICEBROADCASTING,
http://www.voicebroadcasting.org/services/voice-broadcast-dialing/ (last visited May 5,
2012). Predictive dialers are computer programs that use sophisticated algorithms to predict
2012]
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calls up to twenty percent of the entire U.S. population. 4 Furthermore,
robocalls are relatively cheap due to low production and distribution costs. 5
Robocalls can be sent for well under ten cents per phone call.' 6 When com-
pared to the costs of producing, manufacturing, and mailing political adver-
tisements, robocalls are quite the bargain. 7
In addition to their low costs, robocalls are easy to track and can be
quickly produced. 8 The ease and accuracy of tracking robocalls offer politi-
cal campaigns advantages that are not available with print advertising.' 9 A
campaign may keep track of which addresses it sends mailers to, but it has
no way of knowing how many people actually read the mailer compared to
how many people trashed it without reading it.2" However, robocall compa-
nies can focus calls to specific cities or states with targeted calling2' and still
keep track of precisely how many phone calls were completed, how many
were prematurely ended by hang up,2" as well as how many calls were an-
swered by an answering machine.23 Such statistics allow political campaigns
to track the public's general interest in their candidate and/or message.
The extremely quick turnaround time between the conceptualization
and dissemination of a robocall might be its greatest, most exclusive benefit.
For example, in Maryland's 2010 gubernatorial race, Brian Murphy's cam-
paign was able to write, record, and submit a recording and accompanying
phone number list to the robocall firm within two hours after Sarah Palin
"the timing and number of calls being made," the quantity of disconnected and non-answered
telephone numbers they will encounter, and the number of calls that will be automatically
answered by voicemail or answering machines, in order to simultaneously dial the optimum
quantity of phone numbers at one time. Predictive Dialing, VOICEBROADCASTING,
http://www.voicebroadcasting.org/services/predictive-dialing/ (last visited May 5, 2012).
14. Heam, supra note 6.
15. Kaitlin Kovach, How Robocalls Work, CONGRESS.ORG,
https://ssl.congress.org/news/2010/10/29/howrobocalls-work (last visited May 5, 2012).
16. See id.; see also ROBODIALORG, http://www.robodial.org/pricing.php (last visited
May 5, 2012) (charges $25 setup fee plus $0.01 - 0.05 per call, depending on the length of
call).
17. See generally Dennis Cauchon, States Try to Pull Plug on 'Robo-calls, 'ABC NEWS
(Jan. 19, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id-4152761 &page= 1 #.T6Xew-3R3zI
("A robo-call costs 2 to 4 cents per household compared with about 50 cents for direct
mail."); David W. Nickerson, Partisan Mobilization Using Volunteer Phone Banks and Door
Hangers, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI., Sept. 2005, at 10, 21 (noting that direct mail-
ers cost approximately forty cents to produce and mail).
18. Kovach, supra note 15.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Automated Dialing, supra note 8.
22. Kovach, supra note 15.
23. See Political Automated Calls, supra note 13 ("Our state of the art system can detect
a live call and answering machine message. Some clients record separate messages for an
answering machine and a live call-if [sic] a person picks up the phone.").
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agreed to endorse him. 24 This ability to quickly produce and distribute pre-
recorded messages to millions of households allows campaigns to respond
to any time sensitive issues that may arise. Prior to robocalls, there was lit-
tle, if any, way that a campaign could respond to last minute allegations by
the opposition. If voters received an opponent's negative ad the day before
election day, the campaign had very little time to develop and disseminate a
radio or television response. With the advent of robocalls, however, a cam-
paign can now directly respond to last minute allegations within hours.
C. The Negative Aspects of Political Robocalls
The negative aspects of robocalls are often forced upon the recipient of
the call, opposing political campaigns, and unrelated third parties. In fact, it
is the many positive characteristics of robocalls, such as the low cost,25 the
potential mass quantities of automatically dialed calls,26 and the ability to
produce them in mere hours,27 that create a perfect storm for abuse. This
problem is compounded by the complete lack of accountability for cam-
paigns that do not adhere to disclosure standards or calling guidelines.2 8
Perhaps the most obvious downside to robocalls is that recipients simp-
ly find them inconvenient and annoying. 9 Many candidates request "live
calls," which are made in the evening,3° but these calls anger some recipi-
ents,31 and people often hang up on such calls. 32 Evening robocalls can be
24. Kovach, supra note 15.
25. Kovach, supra note 15; ROBODIAL.ORG, http://www.robodial.org/pricing.php (last
visited May 5, 2012).
26. Hearn, supra note 6.
27. Kovach, supra note 15.
28. The Federal Election Commission requires all political committees and any person
who solicits contributions or expressly advocates for the election or defeat of a candidate to
give a disclaimer when sending more than 500 robocalls in a month that clearly states the
name of the authorizing committee and indicates who paid for the communication or, in the
case of calls not authorized by a candidate committee, states other information that would
allow a recipient to identify and contact the person authorizing the calls. See 11 C.F.R. §§
110.1 (a)-(b) (2012); 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(22), (24) (2012). However, the author was unable to
locate even a single instance where these rules were enforced in Arkansas-despite the ram-
pant violations that have occurred.
29. Tim West, Editorial, Robocalls Are the Restroom Wall of Politics, NAPERVILLE SUN,
Mar. 13, 2012, http://napervillesun.suntimes.com/news/west/l 1132901-418/robocalls-are-
the-restroom-wall-of-politics.html ("I haven't been keeping track of how many robocalls I've
received this election period, but any number above zero is more than I wanted.").
30. Kovach, supra note 15. "Live calls" are calls that are made at a time, typically in the
evening, when the call is more likely to be answered by a live person, rather than an answer-
ing machine. Id.
31. Iowa, NH Voters Heavily Courted, Dems Have Edge in Personal Contact: Cam-
paign 'Robo-Calls' Pervasive, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 7, 2007), http://people-
press.org/report/377/iowa-nh-voters-heavily-courted-dems-have-edge-in-personal-contact.
2012]
UALR LAW REVIEW
especially irritating because they sometimes interrupt the family dinner or
other family activities.33 Furthermore, some robocalls come at an even more
inconvenient time-the middle of the night. For example, in 2010, a
robocall using former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's voice
accidentally went out to voters at 1:00 a.m.
34
People are also irritated by the frequency of robocalls.35 In 2006, some
voters received ten to twelve robocalls per day with an ad that purported to
make Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Donald Corbin look good. 36 His re-
election campaign, however, did not produce the calls. 37 Justice Corbin be-
lieved the excessive robocalls were part of a ploy to irritate voters enough to
cause them to vote for his opponent.38 To compound the problem, the con-
tent of the robocalls could have led to judicial ethics discipline. 39 These
events highlight the fact that robocalls can be used-indeed, sometimes are
being used-to unjustly tarnish the reputation of opposing political candi-
dates.
There are other instances of opposing candidates using multiple
robocalls as a tactic to annoy voters and turn them against the candidate
perceived as making the call. Just prior to Election Day in 2010, a series of
four back-to-back robocalls purporting to be from then-congressional candi-
date Matt Zeller asked constituents to vote for Zeller.4" However, both
Zeller and his opponent, Tom Reed, denied all responsibility in sending the
32. Robo-Calls Now Top Type of Campaign Outreach, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
PUBLICATIONS (Apr. 3, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/785/robo-calls-election-2008
(finding that more than half of the people who receive robocalls normally hang up).
33. See, e.g., Mike Masterson, Editorial, Short-circuit the Robocalls, ARKANSAS
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 15, 2010, available at LEXIS (describing robocalls as a "rude
disruption" and "unwelcome").
34. Ben Smith, O'Connor Backs off Robocalls, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2010, 12:35 AM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1010/OConnor backs off robocalls.html. It should
be noted that Justice O'Connor did not authorize the use of her recorded statement as part of
the robocall campaign. Id.
35. See, e.g., Laura Kellams, Illegal in State Since '81, Computer Calls Remain Popular
with Politicians, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 15, 2006, available at LEXIS.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. ("The problem was the content of the messages could get [Justice Corbin] in
trouble over judicial ethics - it referred to specific issues that might come before the court -
and the calls were relentless.").
40. Jeffrey Blackwell, 29th District Candidates Dispute Origin of 'Robo-calls', STAR-
GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 2010,
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/stargazette/access/2177127261.htmI?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:
FT&date=Nov+1%2C+2010&author=Jeffiey+Blackwell&pub=Star+-
+Gazette&edition=&startpage=n%2Fa&desc=29th+District+candidates+dispute+origin+of+
%27robo-calls%27.
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calls, and both accused each other of being behind the calls.4' In the same
election cycle, the North Carolina Democratic Party claimed that Republi-
cans targeted Democrat and independent voters with robocalls that purport-
ed to support Democratic candidates; some voters received up to eight
robocalls in a row.42 As illustrated, the frequency of these repetitive, uniden-
tified calls understandably frustrates some voters.
The problem in identifying the source of robocalls stems from the fact
that robocallers can avoid detection by "spoofing. '43 "Spoofing occurs when
a caller causes a fictitious phone number to appear on caller-identification
units . . . ."' A fictitious phone number prevents the call's recipient from
being able to correctly identify the actual originating phone number and,
thus, from being able to identify who actually sent the call.45
Robocall spoofing has potentially dangerous side effects to third parties
when the fictitious phone number being used is an actual telephone number.
In another instance where two candidates blamed each other for originating
robocalls, the real victim was the Adair County Ambulance District.46 In this
instance, the fictitious phone number used was actually the number to the
ambulance district.47 Apparently referring to the number on their caller iden-
tifications, over 150 upset voters flooded the ambulance district with calls
complaining about the robocalls they had received.48 One candidate correct-
ly explained that such robocall spoofing is "dangerous and puts people's
safety at risk by flooding [the ambulance district's] phone lines with com-
plaints.,49
Yet another negative aspect of robocalls is how they have confused
voters and suppressed election turnout. Robocalls have instructed voters that
41. Id.
42. Joan McCarter, Dirty Voter Suppression Tricks in North Carolina, DAILY Kos (Nov.
1, 2010, 8:46 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2010/11/1/915944/-Dirty-voter-
suppression-tricks-in-North-Carolina; see also Suzy Khimm, Bogus Robocalls Still Bombard-
ing Kansas, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 2, 2010,
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2010/11/bogus-robocalls-kansas-investigation (reporting
sabotaging robocalls that "reminded" Democrats to vote on Wednesday when the election
was, of course, on Tuesday and to bring "required" documentation, which was not, in fact,
required).
43. Linda Satter, Pay $138,534, Orders Robocall-suit Judge Federal Case Against Auto-
warranty Firm the 2nd of 7 State Lodged in '09, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, June 11,
2010, available at LEXIS.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 'Robo-calls' Spark Accusations, KJRKSVILLE DAILY ExPREss, Oct. 28, 2010,
http://www.kirksvilledailyexpress.com/news/x 1696238118/-Robo-calls-spark-accusations.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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voting requires documents they may not possess, 50 that Election Day was
November 3rd not November 2nd,5' that there was no reason they should
show up to vote, 52 to go to incorrect polling locations
53 and to vote online.54
Finally, while it is possible that robocall technology may exist (or be devel-
oped) to provide voters with the ability to indicate their preference to not
receive robocalls, robocalls typically do not provide such an option.5 5 As
such, voters have no way to indicate that they no longer want robocalls to
intrude upon the privacy of their home, and they will, therefore, continue to
receive such calls until action is taken.
In sum, robocall recipients, opposing political campaigns, and unrelat-
ed third parties bear the brunt of the burden imposed by these political de-
vices. Those characteristics that are beneficial to the robocaller, such as the
low cost and ease of production, create a perfect storm for abuse that is
compounded because campaigns that refuse to adhere to any sort of disclo-
sure standards or calling guidelines are not held accountable. Because the
harms should not be ignored, even in light of the benefits, certain regula-
tions on political robocalls are desired.
50. See Khimm, supra note 42. Political robocalls in Kansas instructed voters to bring
proof of home ownership and voter registration, neither of which is required to vote. Id.
While many voters may have voter registration paperwork, many voters are not homeowners,
and may be persuaded not to vote because of they do not possess the "necessary" paperwork.
51. Id.; Kim Zetter, Malicious RoboCalls Aim at Suppressing Election Day Turnout,
WIRED (Nov. 2, 2010, 6:58 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/11/robocalls/.
52. See John Wagner, Gansler Files Federal Complaint in Election Robocalls Episode,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2010,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/annapolis/2010/1 1/gansler _filesfederal_complain.html.
A political consultant working for a Republican campaign sent 112,000 robocalls that said
Hello. I'm calling to let everyone know that Governor O'Malley and President
Obama have been successful. Our goals have been met. The polls were correct,
and we took it back. We're okay. Relax. Everything is fine. The only thing left is
to watch it on TV tonight. Congratulations and thank you.
Id.
53. Jared Miller, Campaign Calls Draw Scrutiny, STAR-TRIBUNE (Wyoming), Nov. 15,
2010, http://trib.com/news/topstory/article_82db5bc9-435a-5acb-a710-6f5d2063 1 d43.html.
54. Zetter, supra note 5 1.
55. See Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1555 n.13 (8th Cir. 1995).
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III. EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
A. The First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause
The First Amendment of the Constitution prevents Congress from
abridging the freedom of speech. 56 This provision has been incorporated to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 57 How-
ever, freedom of speech "is not an unlimited, unqualified right."58 Rather,
societal values, as well as other considerations, sometimes outweigh the
value that society places upon free speech. 59 Therefore, an analysis of the
constitutionality of a statute that restricts speech must identify the type of
speech being restricted before analyzing the restriction itself.6°
First Amendment analysis draws a distinction between restrictions
placed on commercial speech and restrictions placed on other types of
speech, including political expression.6' Commercial speech is defined as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."62 This distinction must be made because the state has more dis-
cretion in regulating commercial speech than other forms of protected
speech.63 Accordingly, an intermediate level of scrutiny is used to assess the
validity of restrictions on commercial speech. 6
After determining the type of speech being restricted, the next step in
the analysis is to examine the restriction itself. There is a meaningful dis-
tinction between restrictions on speech that are content neutral and re-
strictions on speech that are content based. Content-based restrictions are
subject to strict scrutiny; thus, they "must be narrowly tailored to promote a
56. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievanc-
es." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. E.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) ("Freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by
Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.").
58. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)) ("'The question whether speech is, or is not protected by
the First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech.,").
61. E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498-99 (1996).
62. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
63. 44Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 498-99.
64. E.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995).
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compelling [g]overnment interest., 65 Additionally, with content-based re-
strictions, the government must use a less restrictive alternative if one ex-
ists.
66
Content-neutral restrictions are subject to reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions, which "very closely resemble[s] 'intermediate' judicial
scrutiny, a standard with some actual teeth., 67 In order to be content neutral,
these reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions must be "justified with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech., 68 Furthermore, they
must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and..
* leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation" being restricted.69
B. Determining Content Neutrality
In determining whether a restriction on speech is content neutral or
content based, the "controlling consideration" is the purpose of the govern-
ment's restriction.7° The test for determining content neutrality examines
"whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys."'" A restriction is deemed neutral
when it "serves purposes unrelated to the content ... even if it has an inci-
dental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."72
Courts have applied First Amendment analysis to state restrictions on
robocalls. In 1995, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Minnesota
statute 73 that prohibits all robocalls, except in instances where the caller and
the recipient have a prior relationship, business or otherwise.74 The statute
explicitly states that the restriction applies to "any call, regardless of its con-
tent., 75 It also does not limit the restriction to calls made for a particular
65. E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813-14 (2000).
66. Id. at 813 ("If a less restrictive alternative would serve the [g]ovemment's purpose,
the legislature must use that alternative.").
67. Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 439, 452 (2006).
68. E.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
69. Id.
70. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
71. Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. at 293) ("Government regu-
lation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech."').
72. Id.; see also Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the
Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994 (2010).
73. MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325E.26 to .31 (West 2011).
74. Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1551 (8th Cir. 1995).
75. MfNN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.26 subd. 6.
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purpose, though it does allow a recorded message to be played if it is pre-
ceded by a live operator who receives consent to play the message.76
Relying in part on the Eighth Circuit's analysis, the Ninth Circuit up-
held a California statute77 that is very similar to the Minnesota statute in that
it targets all robocalls without reference to the purpose or content of the
call.78
C. Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Reasonableness is at the core of time, place, or manner restriction anal-
ysis as these restrictions may be valid even when they directly infringe on
the freedom of expression. 79 Reasonableness balances general societal val-
ues against the value that society places upon free speech in order to deter-
mine whether the restriction may be upheld as consistent with the First
Amendment. For instance, "the ancient concept that a man's home is his
castle into which not even the king may enter""° exemplifies the notion that
individual privacy in the home is a societal value of the highest order.81 Fur-
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.27.
A caller shall not use or connect to a telephone line an automatic dialing-
announcing device unless: (1) the subscriber has knowingly or voluntarily re-
quested, consented to, permitted, or authorized receipt of the message; or (2) the
message is immediately preceded by a live operator who obtains the subscriber's
consent before the message is delivered. This section and section 325E.30 do not
apply to (1) messages from school districts to students, parents, or employees, (2)
messages to subscribers with whom the caller has a current business or personal
relationship, or (3) messages advising employees of work schedules. This section
does not apply to messages from a nonprofit tax-exempt charitable organization
sent solely for the purpose of soliciting voluntary donations of clothing to benefit
disabled United States military veterans and containing no request for monetary
donations or other solicitations of any kind.
Id.
77. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2874(a) (West 2010) ("Whenever telephone calls are placed
through the use of an automatic dialing-announcing device, the device may be operated only
after an unrecorded, natural voice announcement has been made to the person called by the
person calling.").
78. Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 732-36 (9th Cir. 1996). The California statute also
makes exceptions similar to those in the Minnesota statutes.
79. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984) ("Reasona-
ble time, place, or manner restrictions are valid even though they directly limit oral or written
expression.").
80. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
81. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
471 (1980)) ("The [s]tate's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of
the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society."); Van Bergen v.
Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1554 (8th Cir. 1995).
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thermore, this societal value trumps the value placed on free speech.82 For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a municipal ordinance that pro-
hibits picketing in front of a residence is a content neutral restriction that
promotes a significant government interest of protecting the privacy of the
home. 83 The time, place, and manner restrictions of such ordinances are rea-
sonable because an individual's freedom to not welcome speech into his or
her home outweighs the value of the speech.84
In Van Bergen v. Minnesota,85 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the societal value of the freedom to welcome or reject communi-
cation as a factor in its First Amendment analysis that weighed in favor of
upholding Minnesota's restrictions on robocalls. 86 This is because the priva-
cy interests of individuals in their homes were severely hampered by their
inability to convey to the robocaller that they no longer wished to be con-
tacted.87 Thus, the key distinction that separates live calls from robocalls is
the ability, or lack thereof, of the person being called to actively preserve the
privacy and tranquility of his or her home.88
IV. ARGUMENT
As currently written, Arkansas's prohibition on political robocalls un-
constitutionally violates the First Amendment's freedom of speech clause
because it is a restriction based on the content of the message that fails to
survive strict scrutiny.
The first step in analyzing the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
63-204 is to identify the type of speech being restricted. While the re-
striction does target commercial speech, 89 the restricted speech at issue pro-
82. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85; Van Bergen, 59 F.3d at 1554.
83. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488.
84. Id. at 485. The Court also pointed out that, while we typically expect individuals to
simply avoid speech that is unwelcome, the home is different because of "the unique nature
of the home [as] 'the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick."' Id. at 484 (quoting
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).
85. 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995).
86. Id. at 1554-56.
87. Id. at 1556 ("Because [robocalls] intrude upon the privacy and tranquility of the
home and the efficiency of the workplace, and because the recipient has no opportunity to
indicate the desire not to receive such calls, we find that the government has a substantial
interest in limiting the use of unsolicited, unconsented-to [robocalls].").
88. Id. See also Vivek Arora, Comment, The CAN-SPAMAct: An Inadequate Attempt to
Deal with a Growing Problem, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 313-14 (2006) (arguing
that valid forms of political communication must respect privacy rights).
89. The portions of the statute that address commercial speech concern those calls made
"for the purpose of offering any goods or services for sale, or for conveying information
regarding any goods or services for the purpose of soliciting the sale." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
63-204(2)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
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hibits those calls made "for soliciting information, gathering data, or for any
other purpose in connection with a political campaign."9 Calls made for
these purposes do not constitute commercial speech because they do not
constitute "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience." 9'
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the type of speech
being restricted is content neutral or content based. This step proves to be
the most difficult because the statute does not specifically regulate the con-
tent of the messages, but rather prohibits robocalls for "any ... purpose in
connection with a political campaign." 92 Examining whether the Arkansas
legislature chose to restrict these robocalls because it disagreed with "pur-
poses in connection with a political campaign" is not initially insightful be-
cause the messages being restricted cover the entire spectrum of political
philosophies. 93 More specifically, Arkansas has not restricted a particular
viewpoint but rather an entire category of speakers based on their message's
connection with a political campaign.
Any examination of a speaker's purpose for sending a robocall neces-
sarily includes an analysis of the content of the message. The Arkansas re-
striction does not apply to a class of speakers based on their relationship to a
political campaign; instead, it only applies when their purpose is in connec-
tion with a political campaign. The only objective way to determine the pur-
pose of a robocall is to examine the content of the phone call. For example,
does the prerecorded message support a particular candidate? Is it a negative
ad that chastises a particular candidate or issue and, thus, necessarily sup-
ports that candidate's opponent or the candidate who also rejects that partic-
ular issue?
It is this examination of the content of a robocall that deems Arkansas's
prohibition on political robocalls a content-based restriction. The effect of
the prohibition is not simply "incidental"--it is an absolute and complete
prohibition on virtually all political robocalls. Despite the many negative
aspects of robocalls, the prohibition is not justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech because the statute does not eliminate
robocalls altogether. Instead, it prohibits robocalls only for particular types
of messages.
Arkansas's statute, which only prohibits certain types of robocalls, is
fundamentally different from the statutes the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have
90. Id.
91. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980).
92. ARK. CODEANN. § 5-63-204(a)(1).
93. See supra Part IlI.B. The notion that legislators would categorically disagree with
messages connected to a political campaign, when each of those legislators ran a political
campaign, is preposterous.
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held constitutional.94 Both the Minnesota statute and the California statute
contain blanket prohibitions that, with a few exceptions, apply to all
robocalls, regardless of content.9" They do not specify particular types of
messages that cannot be broadcast via robocalls.96
Because Arkansas's prohibition on political robocalls is a content-
based regulation, it is subject to the strictest level of scrutiny.97 The prohibi-
tion would fail to survive strict scrutiny, however, because less restrictive
alternatives exist that would protect the government's interests.98 Several
less restrictive alternatives include the following: (1) a requirement that rec-
orded messages must be preceded by a live operator99 who would disclose
the identity of the person or organization who authorized the robocall, give
that party's contact information, 100 and receive the recipient's consent before
playing the prerecorded message; (2) a time restriction prescribing when
calls are acceptable; 10' and (3) a prohibition on phone number spoofing. 10 2
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Robocalls should be restricted for many reasons. First, they are gener-
ally annoying; this problem is compounded when calls arrive at extremely
inconvenient times of the day or arrive frequently." 3 Furthermore, cam-
paigns sometimes utilize spoofing to misrepresent that the caller is an op-
posing candidate in order to annoy or misinform voters.'°4 Robocall spoof-
ing also has the potentially dangerous side effect of clogging entire calling
grids and the phone lines of emergency service providers.05 Most im-
portantly, robocalls intrude on an individual's right to privacy in his or her
home. Therefore, Arkansas should restrict political robocalls.
94. See supra Part III.B.
95. See supra Part III.B.
96. See supra Part III.B.
97. See supra Part III.A.
98. See supra Part III.A.
99. Requiring a live operator would return the freedom to protect the "well-being, tran-
quility, and privacy of the home" to individuals by allowing them to opt-out of future
robocalls.
100. This requirement would significantly reduce the number of instances where candi-
dates claim not to have authorized a set of robocalls, as well as other instances of voter sup-
pression. See supra Part II.C.
101. This would prevent robocallers from placing the calls during late hours of the night.
The Eighth Circuit upheld a similar Minnesota restriction. See supra Part III.B.
102. A prohibition on spoofing would prevent potentially dangerous scenarios similar to
what happened with the Adair County Ambulance District. See supra Part II.C.
103. See supra Part II.C.
104. See supra Part II.C.
105. See supra Part II.C.
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Arkansas's prohibition on robocalls should be reworded in order to
pass constitutional muster. As currently written, the statute only prohibits
the use of robocalls for certain purposes. A better strategy would be to use
statutory language that categorically prohibits the use of robocalls regardless
of content; special exceptions can be made for those particular types of
robocalls the state does not wish to restrict. Such a statute would look simi-
lar to the Minnesota statute, which the Eighth Circuit held constitutional.
A content-neutral restriction could be formed from the existing statute
by omitting the portions of section 5-63-204(a)(1) that describe the specific
purposes for which robocalls are prohibited. If implemented, the statute
would read as follows: It is unlawful for any person to use a telephone when
the use involves an automated system for the selection and dialing of tele-
phone numbers and the playing of recorded messages when a message is
completed to the called number.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current state of Arkansas's prohibition on political robocalls is a
mess. While political robocalls are statutorily prohibited, there has been no
attempt to enforce the prohibition against political campaigns out of fear that
the prohibition is an unconstitutional restraint on political speech.' °6 This
situation leads to scenarios where one candidate, believing the prohibition is
unenforceable, may elect to make robocalls, but his opponent, believing that
the prohibition can be enforced, does not utilize such calls. While there are
benefits to robocalls, such as fast production time, relatively low cost, the
ease and accuracy of tracking voter interest, and an ability to reach large
quantities of voters, robocallers enjoy these perks almost exclusively. The
burdens, however, are placed upon robocall recipients, opposing political
campaigns, and unrelated third parties. As a result, the government has an
interest in restricting political robocalls.
Although there is an important governmental interest in restricting
robocalls, Arkansas's statutory prohibition on political robocalls as written
is unconstitutional because it is a content-based restriction that is not nar-
rowly tailored as there are less restrictive alternatives available. The prohibi-
tion is content based, as opposed to content neutral, because any determina-
tion of whether a robocall's purpose is connected with a political campaign
requires an examination of the content of the message. However, by simply
rewording the statute to prohibit all robocalls, Arkansas's prohibition on
106. An opinion from the Arkansas Attorney General, which was released contemporane-
ously with the submission of this note, concluded that Arkansas's statutory prohibition on
political robocalls "is highly constitutionally suspect under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution." Ark. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 2010-151, 2011 Ark. AG LEXIS 45, at *20 (Apr. 8,
2011).
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robocalls will become content neutral and will pass constitutional muster as
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.
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